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The bat t le at St. Eloi between 27 March and 19 April 1916 w a s a m i n o r s i de - show 
compared to the armageddon raging between the 
Germans a n d French at Verdun. Yet, i t was an 
important event for the 2nd Canadian Division 
as it was their first set-piece battle on the Western 
Front. It was also an unmitigated disaster. 
The Battle of the St. Eloi Craters is one of 
those battles which h a s been forgotten, perhaps 
conveniently, by Canadian military historians. 
There are no books or articles devoted to it and 
most military works use throw away lines when 
describing the embarrass ing affair. Only G.W.L. 
Nicholson's official h is tory of the Canad ian 
Expeditionary Force thoroughly records what 
occurred during those two weeks in April. Yet the 
official account is unfortunately sterile and sheds 
little light on the na tu re of the fighting. The men 
who fought at St. Eloi deserve better. 
The 2nd Division was rushed to the Western 
Front in September 1915 to join the 1st Division 
which had distinguished itself at the 2nd Battle 
of Ypres. The two divisions formed the Canadian 
Corps in the soutiiern portion of tbe Ypres sector. 
As the C a n a d i a n s se t t l ed in to t he terr ible 
conditions of t rench warfare, they not only h a d 
to protect themselves from the Germans but also 
from the wind, sleet and m u d as they learned to 
adapt in the maels t rom of destruct ion of the 
Western Front. 
St. Eloi was about five kilometres south of 
the town of Ypres and was situated on the corner 
of a salient, which expanded from a base of 600 
yards wide and penetrated 100 yards northward 
into the Brit ish l ines. As a resul t of earlier 
advances by \he Germans tbe trenches witbin the 
sector ran almost east to west, ra ther tban north 
to south, as was u sua l for the t renches on the 
Western Front. The sector had been the scene of 
vicious fighting throughout the war due to the 
slightly elevated land called the "Mound" which 
commanded a view of the entire area. 
The Canadian Corps was par t of General Sir 
Herbert Plumer's British Second Army. Following 
the accepted military principle of s traightening 
out salients, and wanting revenge for a successful 
Opposite: 
Canadian soldiers returning from the trenches. 
(Photo by W.I. Castle, NAC PA 832) 
German assault against the British held position 
called "The Bluff in February, Plumer ordered V 
Corps to attack and cut off the enemy-held salient 
at St. Eloi, where 33 mines h a d been blown to 
produce a shell-pocked wasteland of mud. 3 
In August 1915, B'ritish sappers had skilfully 
sunk three deep shafts beneatb the German lines. 
The British set three mines beneath the "Mound" 
and the German front line in preparat ion for an 
upcoming operation. Plumer decided tha t the 
Canadians would relieve the at tacking British 
brigades after the positions were taken in order 
to defend the newly-won t renches against the 
inevitable G e r m a n c o u n t e r a t t a c k s . This , of 
cou r se , w a s n o t a n ideal s i t u a t i o n a s t he 
Canadians were taking over trenches which were 
facing the wrong direction, wi thout a clear idea 
of the ground they would be trying to hold. But 
the men of the 2nd Division, eager to get into their 
first battle, were not only willing but unconcerned 
about such "trivialities." It is excusable for naive 
young soldiers to be "chomping at the bit" and 
want ing to see bat t le , b u t w h a t abou t their 
commanders? 
The Battle 
At 0415 hours on 27 March 1916 the British opened up with their guns and detonated the 
mines which all b u t obliterated the enemy front 
line. The blast was so powerful that it was heard 
at Folkestone, in Kent, England.4 The massive 
explosion wiped out the old l andmarks of the 
battlefield and collapsed trenches on botb sides.5 
The outcome was seven large cra ters which 
pockmarked the "Mound" - numbered 1 to 7 from 
west to east. 
The British 9th Brigade at tacked as soon as 
the mines were blown, swarming over the German 
l ines . The 1st Ba t t a l ion , N o r t h u m b e r l a n d 
Fusiliers captured their objectives, b u t the 4 th 
Royal Fusiliers, attacking on tbe left near Craters 
5 and 6, were held up by small-arms fire and the 
boggy terrain. A gap was left in the British lines 
and into it flowed the quick-reacting German 
troops who occupied Crater 5.6 In bloody hand-
to-hand combat, the British struggled for a week 
to drive the Germans out until the 8th King's Own 
Scottish Borderers finally captured tbe last crater 
on 3 April. 
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Initially the Canadians were to replace the 3rd 
Division on the night of 6/7 April, but due to the 
exhaustive struggle and the intense casualties the 
relief of the 3rd Division was moved up three 
nights to 3 /4 April.7 The British feared a strong 
German counterattack would drive the exhausted 
British troops out of the hard-won lines; it was 
decided by Plumer to replace them, even though 
their lines were unstable, with the 2nd Canadian 
Division.8 Initially it was suggested by the British 
that the Canadians lend one Brigade to the 3rd 
Division as new troops, but General Edwin 
Alderson, commander of the Canadian Corps, 
decided that the Canadians should take over the 
line in its entirety rather than dissect the Division.9 
Although it was important to keep the Division 
together, this unplanned early relief only added 
to the confusion of the new Canadian Division.10 
At 0300 hours on 4 April, the 6th Canadian 
Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General 
H.D.B. Ketchen, took over from the British 76th 
Brigade in front of the craters. Private Fraser of 
the 31st Battalion, remembered how the relieving 
British troops could furnish them with no 
information and as the exuberant Canadians 
passed by the dejected British, one Canadian 
whispered, "Cheer up! Don't be downhearted!" 
"You'll be downhearted," whispered the Tommy, 
"when you see what's up there; I have lost my 
best chums."11 Perhaps the Tommy sobered up 
the Canadians, but nothing could fully prepare 
them for the horror they were about to encounter. 
Craters 2 , 3 , 4 and 5 had been blown close 
together and they formed an impassable obstacle 
- the largest hole being 50 feet deep and 180 feet 
across. The 27th Battalion took over the trenches 
in front of the first five craters. Sergeant A.H. Bell 
described the Canadian line as being "on a 
forward slope, in full view of the enemy, and owing 
to the shape of the salient, exposed to artillery 
fire from the front, as well as from behind the left 
flank."13 
When the Canadians took over the line, they 
had only a vague idea where they were relative to 
the enemy and where their positions were on their 
maps.1 4 Even the Divisional Summary of 
Operations, rather dour in its descriptions, 
described the new line as "more of a line on the 
map than an actual line of defence."15 The terrible 
state of the trenches made an impression on 
Private Fraser: 
26 
When day broke, the sights that met our gaze 
were so horrible and ghastly that they beggar 
descr ip t ion . Heads , a r m s a n d legs were 
protruding from the mud at every yard and dear 
knows how many bodies the earth swallowed. 
Thirty corpses were at least showing [in] the 
crater and beneath its clayey waters other victims 
must be lying killed and drowned.16 
A Divisional order to Canadian Battalion 
commanders stated that "the craters themselves 
will form an obstacle in front of the middle of the 
line and will help towards its defence. The flank 
portions of the new line will be wired as soon as 
possible, and listening posts and bombing posts 
will be arranged for."17 Although sensible orders, 
due to the hurried relief the Canadian officers had 
been unable to reconnoitre the front lines and 
what they now found left them appalled. The 
trenches were from two to three feet deep in water, 
for all the natural drainage in the area had been 
destroyed by shell fire and the explosion of the 
mines.18 There was no barbed wire and there were 
only machine guns in four of the 12 posts that 
were supposedly held by British Lewis gunners.19 
More detrimental was the lack of a continuous 
defensive t r ench due to the mass ive 
bombardment by the German shells. The soldiers 
of the 27th Battalion were forced to inhabit shell 
craters and used night patrols in the hope of 
linking some form of common defence. 
To the left of the 27th Battalion, the 31st 
Battalion held the smaller craters 6 and 7. The 
craters had not been manned by the British, who 
considered them a target for German artillery. But 
Ketchen planned to consolidate them, for they 
were on higher ground and dryer than the watery 
ditches the Canadians were currently holding. 
That first night the Canadians set to shoring up 
their defences as the German guns remained 
relatively silent. 
The Canadians worked hard at improving 
these defences, with the 2nd Pioneer Battalion 
attempting to dig a communication trench from 
the support trenches to the craters, reversing the 
parapet of the front line, pumping out some of 
the water and removing the British and German 
dead. Over 600 men in the working parties 
doggedly hoped to strengthen the trenches before 
daylight, but "at dawn...a very intense hostile 
bombardment opened on all trenches...of the 
Divisional front, causing great destruction to the 
defensive works and inflicting heavy casualties."20 
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Throughout 4 and 5 April, the whole 
Canadian front was intensely bombarded, 
resulting in mounting casualties. By noon on the 
4th every second man in one of the 27th's forward 
companies had been hit.21 Frank Maheux recalled 
the horrific conditions in a letter to his wife, "We 
were walking on dead soldiers and the worse was 
they was [sic] [in] about three feet of mud and 
water. I saw poor fellows trying to bandage their 
wounds, bombs, heavy shells falling all over 
them... .it is the worst sight that a man ever wants 
to see."22 The battalion commander, Lieutenant-
Colonel I.R. Snider, was forced to thin out his 
front line to avoid more crippling casualties, but 
this made them more vulnerable to a German 
infantry assault. In front of the craters, the 
Canadians only had a few bombing parties and 
four Lewis gun detachments due to the lack of 
suitable trenches.23 
The 31st Battalion's War Diary has the 
disconcerting note for 4 April, "A Company, 
holding right of our line, including No. 5 Crater 
in front of St. Eloi, is not in direct communication 
with balance of Battalion."24 Not only were the 
3 lst's Companies not in contact with each other 
but they were not in contact with the neighbouring 
27th Battalion. A company commander described 
the chaos: 
The conditions were such that I personally could 
do little or nothing. The communication between 
Battalion HQs and companies was much broken 
and, in the same manner, platoons and smaller 
bodies were cut off from their Company 
Commanders, and were obliged to act on their 
own responsibility.25 
For the inexperienced Canadians, this led to 
confusion and a static position as frightened men 
attempted to burrow into the ground to escape 
the shelling. 
On the 6th, still defiantly entrenched in front 
and in its craters, the 31st Battalion was blasted 
by the German artillery for 17 continuous hours. 
The shelling was, as one soldier noted, "painfully 
accurate."26 The War Diary recorded the 
bombardment as: 
A most terrific c o n c e n t r a t e d enemy 
bombardmen t . . . [ t hey are] u s i n g t r e n c h 
torpedoes and all shells of all kinds and sizes. 
Hundreds of shells must be bursting per minute. 
We must expect heavy losses.. .27 
Casualties began to flow back to the medical 
officer who recorded "cases of sha t te red 
nerves...[due to] some men being buried by 
shells" and "a number [of men]...coming in with 
chilled, sodden feet....[from] standing in water 
and mud for 48 hrs [without relief]."28 Yet the[ 
Canadians responded in kind. Major Daly 
recorded that his platoon was cut off during the 
bombardment and attacked by about 150 
Germans, but he and "his platoon opened up with 
rapid rifle fire under heavy bombardment, and 
accounted for about 25 dead at close range."29 
The 31st may have been demoralized and 
battered, but it refused to break. 
On the morning of 6 April, the 29th Battalion 
began to relieve the badly mauled 27th Battalion.30 
The men of the 27th were exhausted and "most 
officers had not slept for over 100 hours."In three 
days they had suffered 40 killed and 189 
wounded.31 With only one narrow communication 
trench for both the exhausted and wounded 
defenders and the fresh troops of the 29th, the 
relief took much too long to carry out. The 
Germans, aware that inexperienced or sloppy 
troops were coming into the line, attacked behind 
a violent artillery barrage. 
The Germans raided with two battalions 
astride the road that ran from St. Eloi south-
eastward between the 3rd and 4th crater. Due to 
the broken front line there was a gap of 80 yards 
between the right flank of the 31st Battalion and 
the left flank of the 27th Battalion. At no time 
were the two units touching each other and the 
gap was covered with only two platoons of 
bombing parties.33 The unfortunate bombing 
parties were quickly overrun and within three 
hours the Germans had regained Craters 2, 3, 4 
and 5. 
The greatest failure during the battle was that 
those in the rear, did not know what was occurring 
at the "sharp-end." Lieutenant S.H. Wilson of the 
27th Battalion described their situation: "Men 
were holed up in shellholes and it became 
impossible to keep in touch....It was impossible 
to use runners in the daylight, the enemy being 
in the habit of using field guns for sniping 
purposes, and [with] the landmarks constantly 
changing in many cases my runners could not 
find their objectives after dark."34 The atrocious 
weather which kept aerial reconnaissance to a 
minimum, combined with the intense German 
27 
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The St. Eloi Craters, photographed from the air, 16 April 1916. 
(Mitchell-Turner Air Photos Collection, NAC C-43979) 
The enemy, possibly expecting such a move, and 
not seeming to care whether they hit our men 
or their own, sprayed the craters all morning 
with heavy shrapnel . The reconnaissance 
returned all wounded except the officer, who 
deemed a change in plans necessary.37 
Following the failure to take Crater 2 and S 
Ketchen ordered the 31st, reinforced by the 28tf 
to retake Crater 4. From a starting position i: 
Craters 6 and 7, the bombers could see the hig] 
lip of a crater to their right. Enemy shellfire an 
heavy rain, combined with the darkness, confuse 
the 75 raiders and they attacked and took a serie 
of small craters north of Crater 4. As Sergean 
A.H. Bell wrote after the war: 
The craters...referred to were not No. 4 and 5, 
as we supposed but the foremost of a group of 
three [craters] which faced No. 4 crater [to its 
North].. ..At this time we did not realize that this 
part of the front was pelted with a mass of craters 
of varying sizes (but all of them very large to us) 
and therefore, firmly believed that we had made 
Nos. 4 and 5 secure.38 
artillery barrages, left General Richard Turner, 
commander of the 2nd Division, and the staff 
officers at Divisional Command with an unclear 
idea of what was occurring. In the Summary of 
Divisional Operations for 7 April, it was reported 
that, "after an intense bombardment which 
destroyed all communication and wire, it was 
reported to the Divisional HQ that there were no 
Germans in C5, but suspected Germans in C3 
and C4."35 The Divisional and Brigade 
Headquarters did not realize the full extent of their 
losses (the Germans were in all three craters), 
while the inexperienced soldiers at the front had 
even less idea of what positions they held. 
Upon losing the craters the Canadians 
launched a daylight counterattack, but the raiding 
party of bombers from the 27th and 29th were 
virtually annihilated by German defenders as they 
struggled to get within throwing distance.36 The 
Canadians attempted to take the Craters again 
but the raid was cancelled; as the Intelligence 
Summary recorded: 
28 5
Cook: The Battle of the St. Eloi Craters
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1996
Interestingly, on the night of the 7th three 
Germans were captured by a Canadian patrol. 
The Summary of Operations reported that , "2 of 
these prisoners came from C3 and one states that 
he h a d been in C4. They all were u n a n i m o u s in 
stating that the Germans hold all the craters - 2, 
3, 4 and 5 - with seventy men each."41 This 
troubling information was recorded, b u t both 
Turner and Brigadier Rennie did nothing to verify 
the prisoners ' testimonies. 
The Canad ians were in a b a d s i tuat ion, 
defending the low ground of a poorly constructed 
defensive position, and su r rounded by artillery 
on three sides which was firing into a narrow area 
of front. On the 8th General Turner suggested to 
Plumer that he should either pull the Canadians 
out of the craters and bomb the Germans with 
artillery, as they were doing to the Canadians, or 
at tack on a wider front in order to have a larger 
target for the German artillery to fire at. To attack 
on a wider front would have been suicide, for 
surprise was lost and the porridge-like conditions 
of the front would make the crossing of no-man's-
land close to impossible for the heavily-laden 
soldiers. The other option was to pull out of the 
untenable position, as one company commander 
29 
The men of the 28 th began to dig in against 
the expected artillery onslaught , b u t "suffered 
heavy casualties and were relieved that night."39 
The s i tua t ion as repor ted by the Division's 
Summary of Operations, was that, "Our bombers 
and infantry companies in suppor t were still in 
Cr. 4."40 With no aerial photography, Turner relied 
on his men, who had no maps or any battlefield 
features in which to guide themselves. 
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suggested in a report: "To even attempt to hold 
this [the Craters] if we are successful in winning 
it, in the first place, would be rather like 
committing useless murder."42 But General 
Turner either did not have the courage to stand 
up to the British, or was convinced that was it 
unnecessary to demand the withdrawal. 
During the night of 9/10 April, Brigadier 
General Rennie of the 4th Infantry Brigade 
ordered the recapture of Crater 3. Despite the 
muddy conditions at daybreak, it was reported 
looked like another. It was not until the morning 
of the 11th that Brigadier Rennie received word 
that the Canadians did not hold the northern lips 
ofCrater2and3. 4 5 
The following night the Germans attempted 
to enlarge their holdings, but were driven back 
by Canadian bombers.4 6 The Summary of 
Operations recorded that "the 18th and 19th 
Battalion reported a German bombing attack on 
Crater 4 and 5."47 Since the 18th and 19th were 
not in Crater 4 and 5 but rather in craters to the 
A Canadian soldier cleaning up on the battlefield. 
(NAC PA 1193) 
to Rennie that the raiding party of 50 men from 
the 18th Battalion were holding the crater.43 
Unfortunately, for reasons unknown, but likely 
due to the weather, darkness and inexperience of 
the troops, the report was once again inaccurate. 
Trie Canadians were not in Crater 3 but rather in 
much smaller craters to the north of the German 
fortified position. Up to this point it was thought 
that there were only seven craters; in fact there 
were seventeen craters of varying sizes. Thus the 
raiding parties, moving over the blasted landscape 
at night without proper maps or guidance from 
the rear, had little idea of where they were going 
and could only attack craters which were in front 
of them. From their position, one large crater 
30 
north of them, it is no wonder they were perplexed 
as to where the Germans were attacking from. If 
the Canadians were holding the front, from where 
were the Germans mounting these raiding 
parties? With this accumulating evidence, it is 
astonishing that Turner or his Brigadiers did not 
attempt to ascertain a clearer view or ask pointed 
questions as to the location of his men and the 
enemy.48 
Scouts were sent out by the 18th and 19th 
Battalions on 12 April to investigate the German 
defences around Crater 3. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hilliam reported that "the Crater was strongly 
held and impossible to approach." But more 
7
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importantly, "[Canadian raiding] attempts were 
made from Crater 4 and 5 [thought to be held by 
the Canad ians ] and every a t t empt was 
immediately driven in by machine gun fire from 
the enemy trench in rear of the craters [the real 
Crater 4 and 5]."49 Some of the Canadians at the 
front began to realize that there was something 
wrong with their position in relation to orders 
passed down from the staff officers in the rear. 
Incredibly, Turner still did not know that the 
Germans occupied Crater 4 and 5. And although 
the aerial photography was largely grounded 
during the poor weather, planes had been able to 
go up briefly on the 8th and take photographs of 
the demolished battlefield. Yet despite the aerial 
photographs, no one at the Divisional staff 
detected the error in the occupation of the 
craters.50 Perhaps it was a case of simply not 
wanting to believe the harsh truth, but more likely 
it was a case of shoddy work among staff officers 
not looking for anything because they thought 
there was nothing to search for. 
During the night of 14 April, the 24th 
Battalion relieved the 25th.52 That same night the 
24th defeated a German bombing party from 
retaking Craters 6 and 7 in a ferocious 40 minute 
battle.53 One of the greatest disservices to the 
Canadian infantry attempting to defend against 
the German raiding parties was the complete 
safety of the Germans from the Canadian artillery. 
While the Canadians were being furiously shelled, 
the Germans were consolidating their position 
and launching raids against the Canadians free 
from harassing fire because the Divisional artillery 
thought their position was a Canadian one.54 Any 
movement among the Canadians drew artillery 
fire and the 24th was effectively cut off from its 
commanders in the rear.55 Brigadier Watson, 
commander of the 5th Infantry Brigade, feared 
that the 24th had lost its position and attempted 
to send runners to gather any information. The 
runners were unable to penetrate the artillery box 
barrage set up by the Germans, but the 24th 
Battalion was eventually able to get a pigeon back 
to the rear informing them that it still held the 
position but had suffered heavy casualties.56 
The 2nd Division's Daily Intelligence 
Summary for 15 April reported, "At 2:30 a.m. 
assisted by artillery fire, the enemy made a 
bombing attack on Craters 4 and 5....The craters 
were both in our possession and there are no 
casualties."57 On that same night Major J.A. Ross 
of the 24 th Bat ta l ion made a pe r sona l 
reconnaissance of Craters 2, 3, 4 and 5 and was 
shocked to find that they were in enemy hands. 
This was confirmed by aerial photography on the 
16th and all plans for "offensive operations were 
therefore cancelled."59'Although the Divisional 
Headquarters ordered the battle to be ended, that 
meant very little for the infantry in the trenches 
or for the Germans.60 
On the night of the 16th, to further harass 
the Canadian defenders, the Germans fired tear-
gas shells into the 24th's position causing, as the 
regimental historian modestly wrote, "a number 
of men...to be affected."63 The exhausting 
conditions of the front were a great strain on all 
the Canadians, but they clung on with grim 
determination and repulsed another attack that 
night.64 
In the dark hours of 17 April, the 29th 
Battalion relieved the 24th in front of Crater 6 
and 7 and repulsed another German raid.65 It was 
reported by Lieutenant Grosvenou of the 29th 
Battalion "that Crater 6's position was absolutely 
untenable and the condition [was] beyond 
description."66 Not surprisingly, therefore, under 
an intense artillery bombardment and driving rain 
on the night of the 19th, a German raiding party 
captured Crater 6 from the battered defenders. 
Lieutenant C.R. Myers described the near-
hopeless situation of the men in the craters: 
[The] Germans started to shell our crater with 
5.9 HE [shells] at 4/min. I placed my men under 
what little cover was afforded by the 'lean to' 
under the parapet but in several cases a direct 
hit was made and casualties resulted. All of the 
pigeons in the crater had been killed so there 
was no way to get information back to HQ. The 
barrage continued with the parapet. . .being 
blown In several places.67 
With only a dozen men left unwounded, 
Lieutenant Myers ordered a defence of the parapet 
against the German attack. "It was then found," 
Myers wrote, "that none of our weapons would 
work [due to the mud], the Lewis gun was also 
out of commission and most of the bombs had 
been exploded by HE."68 Half of the men 
surrendered, while the other half crawled away 
through machine gun fire to escape. Of the one 
hundred or so men defending Crater 6, only 
31 
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eleven returned to the rear and only one was 
uninjured.70 
Upon hearing of the loss, Major Tait of the 
29th Battalion ordered a raiding party to regain 
Crater 6. The attack was held up by "machine 
gun fire in the lip of No. 5 crater."71 Two more 
companies of the 31st Battalion were brought up, 
but it was "thought [by Tait] that such an attack 
across about 800 yards of open ground badly cut 
up by shell holes in daylight would be costly. "72 
Tait was right and he saved two companies from 
being annihilated. And thus ended the Canadians' 
involvement with the battle for the craters. With 
the Germans in control of all but one of the major 
craters on the "Mound," their commanders wisely 
surveyed the situation and pulled back from the 
untenable position. The sector again became quiet 
as the British and Canadians attempted to 
de termine who was respons ib le for the 
Canadians' failure. 
Investigation 
As a result of the fiasco at St. Eloi there was a formal examination into the conduct of the 
operation. On 26 April the General Representative 
of Canada at the Front, Sir Max Aitken (later Lord 
Beaverbrook), cabled Sir Sam Hughes, Canada's 
Minister of Militia, that the British viewed St. Eloi 
as a serious breakdown within the Canadian 
command.73 Plumer ordered Lieutenant-General 
Edwin Alderson to take "severe disciplinary 
measures" and wanted to remove both Turner and 
Ketchen for their incompetence.74 Alderson issued 
a damning report regarding Brigadier-General 
Ketchen of the 6th Brigade, whose brigade 
suffered the worst of the disaster, and attempted 
to remove him from command. Turner's refusal 
to endorse Alderson's report and sack Ketchen 
further damaged their relationship, which had 
already been strained with Turner's questionable 
performance during the Second Battle of Ypres.75 
Alderson asked General Haig, commander of 
the British Expeditionary Force, to dismiss 
Tu rne r for h is i n subord ina t ion and 
ineffectiveness. Haig, acting with political 
astuteness and perhaps showing a different side 
to those critics who have labelled him a donkey, 
refused to remove Turner for fear of a political 
backlash in Canada. Turner, a Canadian and 
Victoria Cross winner, could not be released, as 
32 
Haig wrote in his diary, for "the danger of a serious 
feud between Canadians and the British," which 
could be avoided by the simple "retention of a 
couple of incompetent commanders."76 Therefore, 
for political reasons Turner, twice displaying 
incompetence on the battlefield, retained 
command over Canadian troops. 
On 28 May 1916 General Alderson was 
appointed Inspector General of Canadian Forces 
in England, a change brought on by the debacle 
at St. Eloi, but more importantly through the 
political interference of Sir Sam Hughes and Max 
Aitken. Aitken had reiterated the need to keep 
the Canadian generals, who could not be retained 
if Alderson were in command.78 Hughes, no 
stranger to meddling in military affairs, had an 
intense dislike for Alderson as a result of the Ross 
rifle debate and had no qualms in sacrificing him. 
Although Inspector General was lower on the 
chain of command, Haig believed, after being 
"briefed" by Aitken, that "the difficulty under 
which the commander of the Canadian Corps in 
the field now suffered through having so many 
administrative and political questions to deal 
with, in addition to his duties as commander in 
the field" should be alleviated.79 He was replaced 
by Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, who 
quickly won over the Canadian troops.80 While 
Alderson became the scapegoat of the affair and 
was released for political rather than military 
reasons, the historian is left asking who is really 
to blame? 
The question arises how could the Canadians 
have had no idea where they were at the front? 
The key for a commander to properly react to 
what was occurring in battle was both to 
understand what was happening and then to 
respond appropriately. It is a difficult task, but 
one which the commander must master - and it 
was one which the senior Canadian officers failed 
to accomplish at St. Eloi. 
The most important breakdown at St. Eloi 
was not the Canadians' discipline or fighting 
ability, but rather communication between the 
front and rear. Communication was a constant 
problem throughout the War.84 With the front so 
broad as well as so deadly, most commanders 
stayed in the rear in an attempt to exert some 
control over the situation. At St. Eloi, the constant 
bombardment made it difficult for the Canadians 
to keep telephone wire from being cut, let alone 
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One of the craters at St. Eloi. It was here that the 29th (Vancouver) Battalion was engaged in heavy 
fighting. The scale of the crater can be seen by the wagon and person on the Jar side of the crater. 
(NAC PA 4394) 
artillery patterns Indicating changed positions at 
the front, and the inexperience of the Canadian 
troops, a more diligent attempt should have been 
m a d e to u n d e r s t a n d the s i t ua t ion . This i s 
especially t rue because Turner knew tha t by 
relieving the British Division three days earlier 
t han intended, he h a d not allowed his officers 
enough time to either investigate the trenches or 
to acquire adequate maps of the area. Turner sent 
his troops into the line effectively blind. Never 
was it more truly a case of "the blind leading the 
blind." 
A greater share of the blame, and certainly 
more t han previously assigned by his tor ians, 
mus t fall on the British command. It was Plumer 
who inserted the new Canadian Division into the 
lines at St. Eloi, a tactically u n s o u n d position 
where the enemy h a d all of the advantages and 
was willing to press them. When Turner suggested 
either pulling out of the line or a t tacking on a 
wider front, the British official historian suggests 
that Plumer was misinformed by the 2nd Division 
which craters they held and refused the request.87 
As we have seen this was t rue, b u t it did little to 
change the fact that the Canadians were holding 
an untenable position which should have been 
abandoned after its deficiencies were reported. 
33 
laying new lines.86 The terrible weather conditions 
combined with the confusion of being under fire 
for the first time also did not encourage soldiers 
to stand above the trenches waving flags back to 
headquarters to show tha t they were still alive -
at least for the moment . 
One method of gaining knowledge of the 
battlefield was to employ aerial photography. But 
the fragile airplanes of the day could not be used 
effectively in the rough weather over the St. Eloi 
battlefield where there was almost continual snow, 
sleet and ram. Robbed of information, Turner and 
his Brigadiers were without accurate battlefield 
intelligence. However, the confusion of the 
battlefield h a s often left commanders without 
accurate knowledge of w h a t was occurring. 
Unfortunately Turner, much as he did at the 2nd 
Battle of Ypres, did nothing to rectify such a clearly 
chaotic si tuat ion. He could have sent t rus ted 
officers forward to find out what was happening. 
And he could have analyzed more carefully the 
information he did receive. It is too easy to 
exonerate Turner and his Brigadiers for the poor 
handling of the battle by blaming the inaccurate 
information they received from the front. In light 
of t he conf l ic t ing r e p o r t s from t h e front , 
information given by German prisoners, German 
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One must wonder if Plumer's perception was 
clouded by his desire for revenge against the 
German attack against "The Bluff or if he was 
not fully informed as to the deplorable battlefield 
conditions which the Canadians were fighting in. 
Either way, he must shoulder some of the blame. 
At a lower level the commanding officer of the 
British 3rd Division was negligent in handing over 
inadequately fortified lines to the relieving 
Canadians, yet under the terrible German 
bombardment and vicious trench fighting there 
was little his troops could have done. Ultimately, 
however, Turner must be held accountable for his 
neglect of the situation throughout the battle. The 
2nd Canadian Division was far from being the 
shock troops of 1918, and although it was to 
develop into one of the finest divisions on the 
Western Front, at St. Eloi it was ill-prepared and 
ill-led to defend the newly-won Allied position 
against its experienced and well-supported 
German counterparts. 
In less than three weeks of fighting, the 
C a n a d i a n s had suffered at least 1,373 
casualties.89 Although the casualties were small 
by Western Front standards, they were casualties 
of the most murderous kind: soldiers squatting 
in terror day and night with no chance of 
retaliation or advance against the German shells. 
Fortunately, the men of the 2nd Division were to 
fight in the Battle of the Somme at Courcelette 
where they redeemed themselves and were later 
regarded, as part of the Canadian Corps, as an 
elite formation among the British troops. 
Militarily, St. Eloi was a lesson, albeit a bloody 
one, for the Canadians on how not to engage the 
enemy. It brought the realization that there was 
more to warfare than simply fighting: one had to 
know where one's troops were in relation to one 
another and the enemy. And interestingly, St. Eloi 
displayed the political interference that so often 
affected military conduct. Turner was certainly 
out of his depth as a Divisional commander, yet 
his incompetence was overlooked for fear of 
removing one of Canada's few heroic generals. 
After the St. Eloi battle the British command, 
although sacrificing Alderson for political reasons, 
realized that Turner*was unfit to command front-
line troops and cleared the way for Sir Arthur 
Currie to take command of the Canadian Corps.90 
34 
St. Eloi was a squalid affair in which the 
Canadians were trounced by both German 
commanders and troops. But it was not simply, 
as one historian has observed, a battle in which 
"the 2nd Division lost the ground a British 
division had painfully captured."91 There were 
many factors, especially the incompetence of both 
Canadian and British commanders, which 
deprived the inexperienced soldiers of the 2nd 
Canadian Division of a fair chance to defend its 
position. But just as the 1st Division's troops had 
a bloody inauguration into the Western Front, so 
those of the 2nd Division at St. Eloi displayed in 
defeat the determination and bravery that in time 
marked the Canadian Corps as one of the finest 
fighting forces on the Western Front. 
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